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JAMES S. LIEBMAN*
The capital punishment system in the United States is broken. Studies reveal
growing delays nationwide between death sentences and executions and
inexcusably high rates of reversals and retrials of capital verdicts. The current
system persistently malfuinctions because it rewards trial actors, such as police,
prosecutors, and trial judges, for imposing death sentences, but it does not force
them either to avoid making mistakes or to bear the cost of mistakes that are
made during the process. Nor is there any adversarial discipline imposed at the
trial level because capital defendants usually receive appointed counsel who
either do not have experience trying capital cases or who receive inadequate
resources from the State to pay litigation expenses. Instead, the appellate system
is forced to deal with large amounts of error, creating backlog and delays. This
article proposes a radical trade-offfor capital defendants in which they agree to
give up existing post-conviction review rights in return for a real assurance of
better qualified, higher quality trial counsel. This proposal will avoid the traps of
window dressing reforms, save states a good bit of the expense of appellate
review, and make the capital punishment system more fair, efficient, and
effective.
I. A BROKEN SYSTEM
Recently, colleagues and I issued a report documenting chronically high
reversal rates in thousands of death sentences imposed over decades in the United
States and concluding that the nation's death penalty system is broken.' We came
to this conclusion from two directions.
A. Risk
First, we considered the risk that capital trials will miscarry, condemning the
innocent or others for whom the law does not permit death as a punishment. We
found that 68% of the thousands of death sentences imposed and fully reviewed
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1 See James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in
Capital Cases, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservicesliebman/
liebmanfinal.pdf (June 2000) [hereinafter A Broken System], reprinted in part in James S.
Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEx. L. REV.
1839 (2000) [hereinafter Capital Attrition]. The views expressed in this article are mine alone
and do not reflect those of my colleagues in the death penalty study of which A Broken System
is a part. The goal of that project is to use quantitative analysis as a basis for identifying reform
proposals that are immediately available to policymakers. The goal of this article is to consider
more radical solutions that are less immediately achievable.
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in the United States between 1973 and 1995 were overturned by the courts.' Of
those reversals:
-90% were reversed by elected state judges, whose usual dispositions are to let
even flawed criminal judgments stand-using, inter alia, the harmless error rule3
absent serious reliability concerns;4
-80% at the state post-conviction stage, where data are available, were based on
violations requiring the condemned person to demonstrate a probable effect on
the outcome or inherent prejudice;5 and
-82% at the same stage, where again data are available, did in fact result in a
different outcome on retrial, including 7% ending in acquittal.
6
Furthermore, reliability-impairing malfunctions were persistent and
widespread:
-Reversal rates were greater than 50% in all but three years out of the twenty-
three studied and in all but two states out of the twenty-eight states studied.7
-Even after state direct appeal courts turned back 41% of the capital verdicts
they reviewed as too flawed to be carried out, and state post-conviction courts
turned back at least 10% (and probably considerably more) of the remaining
verdicts, federal courts still found reversible error in 40% of the remaining, twice-
reviewed cases.
-And even the entire, three-tiered inspection process is not infallible. In a
number of cases, a full complement of courts cleared prisoners for execution,
leaving the discovery of the prisoners' innocence to a motley of extra-judicial
actors: a film maker in one case, journalists in several others, a group of intrepid
undergraduate students in a well-known Illinois case, and a burglar in a less-
remarked Florida case. 9
-- Over decades, exonerations of innocent death row inmates have persistently
occurred at a rate of about one for every seven executions.10
Thus, although the rate at which innocent individuals are executed is
unknown--official resistance to post-mortem inquiry makes that rate
unknowable '-all the evidence suggests that it is not zero. And the rate of
2 Capital Attrition, supra note 1, at 1846-50.
3 See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
4 Capital Attrition, supra note 1, at 1855.
5Id. at 1850.6 1d. at 1851-52.
7 A Broken System, supra note 1, at 76 fig. 12; Capital Attrition, supra note 1, at 1853-54.
8 A Broken System, supra note 1, at 5, 26-27,49-52, 53 tbl.5, 130 n.39, 141 n.132, C-1 to 2.
9 James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 2030, 2050-51
n.84, 2095 n.160 (2000) [hereinafter Overproduction] (collecting sources).
'
0 Id. at 2048-50 n.84.
" See, e.g., Frank Green, DNA Tests Not Likely After an Execution: Va. Opposing Third
Request of its Kind, RicHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, March 26, 2001, at A- I (describing resistance
of state officials to requests for DNA samples and other evidence in police files that could
potentially demonstrate that executed individuals were innocent). For an editorial discussing
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executions of people for whom death is not a legal punishment, though some
other penalty may be, is probably substantial.
B. Cost and Effectiveness
The views of people who express at least some support for capital
punishment provided us with a second evaluative perspective. This standpoint is
important because even though the number of death penalty supporters has
declined for five years, they still make up three-fifths to two-thirds of the
American public. 2 For them, the tendency of capital justice to miscarry is not the
only concern. They additionally want to know whether the resources devoted to
the capital system, including to correcting its mistakes, are well-spent given its
overall contribution to justice. People taking this perspective might conclude that
if capital verdicts single out enough deserving killers and are carried out often and
quickly enough to credibly punish past murders while deterring future ones, then
some amount of error is tolerable--especially absent proof that errors escape
detection before irreparable damage is done or that the cost of detecting them is
excessive.
Assuming that the job of the death penalty is to identify offenders for whom
this issue, consider the following:
The Virginia attorney general's office won a round earlier this month when a court in
the Commonwealth turned down petitions to perform posthumous DNA testing on
evidence left over from a controversial execution. The case was that of Roger Keith
Coleman, who was convicted of the rape and murder of his sister-in-law and was put to
death in 1992. A group of newspapers-including The Post-and a New Jersey charity
that investigates wrongful convictions had sought to do modem DNA testing on the
remaining evidence to resolve lingering doubts about the case. There was no good reason
not to do so. But Attorney General Mark Earley, who has since stepped down to run for
governor, nonetheless opposed the requests, arguing that there was no legitimate
controversy about Mr. Coleman's guilt. The question now is whether Virginia will destroy
the evidence and thereby prevent the truth from ever becoming known.
The attorney general's... opposition to posthumous testing is inconsistent with its
obligation to seek truth and acknowledge errors when they happen. Virginia seems more
interested in protecting itself from embarrassment. As a lawyer for the office put it at a
hearing in an earlier posthumous DNA case, "it would be shouted from the rooftops that
the Commonwealth of Virginia executed an innocent man" if the tests went badly for the
state.
The attorney general's zeal to protect convictions at all costs is dangerous ....
Editorial, Justice Before Victory, WASH. POST, June 24, 2001, at B6.
2 Bill Blakemore, Support for Death Penalty Drops (ABC World News Tonight, May 2,
2001), discussed in Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Support for Death Penalty Eases;
McVeigh's Execution Approved, While Principle Splits Public, WASH. POST, May 3, 2001, at
A9 (noting that, even when questioned on the eve of the widely supported execution of
Timothy McVeigh, only 63% of Americans-the lowest proportion measured in years-
expressed support for the death penalty in a recent ABC News-Washington Post poll).
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the law prescribes death as a punishment and to carry out the sanction with the
swiftness and sureness needed to deter and express revulsion for those offenses,
one arrives at the same conclusion: The current system is broken. To see why,
consider the answers that honestly would have to be given to the spouse or other
close relative of a murder victim who has just watched a jury sentence the
defendant to die and who asks, "What happens now?" As our study found:
-From 1973 to 1995, the average time from death sentence to execution was
close to ten years and rising.' 3 The Justice Department recently reported that for
executions occurring in 1999, the average time from verdict to execution was
twelve years.14
--Only about 5% of the nearly six thousand death sentences imposed from 1973
to 1995 were carried out in that period. 5
-In no year since states began readopting the death penalty' 6-including in 1999
when ninety-eight men and women were executed' 7-have more than 3% of the
people on death row been executed. The average is less than 1.5%.18
In other words, if we were honestly to advise the public and victims about the
likely result of imposing any given death verdict, we would have to say that it will
probably remain under review for a decade or more, and then be reversed and
replaced on retrial with a noncapital verdict.' 9 Additionally, we would have to
3 A Broken System, supra note 1, at 9-10.
4 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT 1999, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs (last modified Jan. 16, 2001).
15 A Broken System, supra note 1, at 109-12, 118 fig.35.
16In 1972, the United States Supreme Court provisionally overturned the death penalty
nationwide. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). States began readopting the penalty in
1973.
17 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH Row U.S.A.: SPRING
2001 7, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (Apr. 1, 2001).
18 Capital Attrition, supra note 1, at 1859-60.
19 The families of victims-whom courts and prosecutors fail to inform, and even
misinform, about the frequent delays and reversals of capital verdicts--often face anguish as a
result:
When James Strong was sentenced to death in Pennsylvania for the murder of my
cousin Jane's husband nearly two decades ago, there was a bitter sense of relief for our
family. It wasn't that it was over-nothing like that can really be over-but at least Jane
and their 9-year-old son, Jay, could begin to reorganize their lives. Jane moved out of the
motel near the court, where she had been staying for the trial. She went back to her job,
back to her house; and Jay came home from the neighbors' house where he had been
staying while Jane was at the trial.
Justice had been served. The man who killed John Strock, would die for his crime. Or
so we believed.
But it didn't work that way. The death sentence-with its protracted process of
appeals-locked Jane into a 17-year relationship with her husband's murderer and even
with his family. And it's not over yet.
[F]our years ago Jane got a call. It wasn't the call she had expected. "Just a routine
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describe the high costs of this process, including:
-hundreds of thousands or even millions of additional dollars spent at trial and
on appeal, solely because the original sentence was death;
20
-untold anguish for those most intimately involved--victims 2' and wrongly
condemned prisoners;
22
hearing," she reported being told. "You don't even need to come up." But Jane felt she had
to go....
Jane called me when she got back....
"[W]hat about the hearing?" I asked. "I could hardly follow it," she said. "It seemed
like they went over the same old thing. But they told me when it was over: No problem.
That it was all routine."
I heard nothing more until last December, when a large manila envelope arrived in
my mail. It looked like a calendar, probably a Christmas present, from Jane. I opened it
and discovered it was an opinion from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Strong's
conviction had been overturned. "This matter is remanded for a new trial," the document
read.
The grounds for that decision were that letters had just come to light suggesting that
the DA's office had made a deal at the time of Strong's trial with the attorney for his
partner in the crime, James Alexander, and had failed to disclose this to the court or to the
jury--or even to the assistant DAs who prosecuted the case....
And so it continues. Within the next few months, the whole process will begin
again-with a new trial set for September and pretrial motions due in June. Only this time
it's quite possible that Strong will leave the courtroom a free man. Alexander, whose
testimony probably wouldn't have been believable anyway once the jury heard there had
been a deal, has since died of a heart attack....
Of course, there could have been a reversal in any case. Nobody wants a decision to
be made on incomplete evidence, or a prosecutor to fail to disclose relevant facts. Nobody
wants an innocent man to be put in prison for life, let alone put to death....
My point is that the death sentence had lulled Jane and the rest of us into believing
that she could put one part of her life behind her, that Strong's death would indeed bring
her closure.
I won't ever know for sure how Jane would have felt if Strong had been executed.
Given the questions that have prompted the new trial, that could not have been a good
thing for the cause of justice. The delays that have characterized this case are typical,
though. And because of them, Jane has watched and waited year after unsettling year, only
to discover now that the man whom she believed all these years murdered her husband
may go free....
So Jane's uneasy relationship with the man convicted of murdering her husband
continues. Whatever some people believe about the value of the death penalty, it hasn't
solved anything for our family, and has probably made it all the worse.
William H. Brill, Finality? Not for Us, and It's 17 Years Later, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2001
(Outlook), at B3; see also Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2133-34, 2134 n.247 (giving other
examples).
0 Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2130-33 & nn.244-46.
21 See supra note 19.
22 See, e.g., Maria Glod, Exonerated Inmates Seeking Safeguards for Justice, WASH. POST,
June 28,2001, at BI. She describes the plight of former death row inmate Michael Graham:
Michael Graham said he paced in his prison cell for 14 years yearning for the opportunity
that came yesterday. Graham, a Roanoke roofer who spent those years on death row
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-a discredited criminal justice system whose chief function appears to be
making mistakes, then taking years in a sometimes vain effort to correct them;23
and
-the collapse of any pretense of credible deterrence or retribution.
24
These two descriptions of the death penalty's malfunction-one focused on
the risk of miscarriage, the other on cost and delay-are not new. They are the
standard critiques of the penalty from the left and the right.25 What is new, besides
some documentation and quantification, is the demonstration that the two
critiques are manifestations of the same problem: high and persistent rates of
serious error.
II. FIx OR ABOLISH?
To say the system is broken is to imply that it can and should be fixed. In
another segment of this Symposium, Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker raised a
threshold question: whether we should try to fix it.26 Even if death penalty
skeptics agree with supporters on the underlying problem, the former must still
decide whether to make common cause with the latter on reforms, rather than
pursuing immediate abolition. 7
For me, the question of abolition does not arise. The capital punishment
machine continues to kill. Indeed, as Part III explains, the machine's appetite for
that outcome may be at the root of most of its existing problems, so reform almost
inevitably must run in the direction of fewer death sentences.2" As long as death
before he was released last year, testified [before a committee of the United States Senate]
in favor of sweeping reforms intended to safeguard against the execution of innocent
people.
Id. 23 Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2134-35, 2134 n.248 (collecting sources).
24 Id. at 2057-59 n.104, 2133-34.
21 Compare Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari) (declaring Justice Blackmun's resolve "[flrom this day forward... no
longer [to] tinker with the machinery of death," and instead to vote against affirming all death
sentences, because "[t]he basic question--does the system accurately and consistently
determine which defendants 'deserve' to die?-cannot be answered in the affirmative" and
because "the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must
wrongly kill some defendants"), with Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 956-57 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (declaring then-Justice Rehnquist's
desire to grant certiorari in every capital case that came before the Court on discretionary writ of
certiorari, so that the Court's affirmance of the death verdict could provide a res judicata bar to
all subsequent review, forestalling ever-lengthening court delays).
26 See Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative "Reform"
of the Death Penalty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 421 (2002).27 See id.
28 See infra notes 35--38 and accompanying text.
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penalty opponents cannot simply unplug the machine-and they probably cannot
any time soon, given how popular the death penalty remains29-there is good
reason on all sides to attend to how, and how many, the death machine kills, and
how well it serves its assigned purposes.
Parts IV and V proceed, therefore, from the assumption that, viewed from
many perspectives, the capital punishment system is broken, and they ask what
can be learned by contemplating its reform. First, however, Part 1I1 analyzes the
issue of causation: Why does the existing death penalty system so often misfire,
making system-defeating, as well as life-threatening, mistakes?
III. PERPETUAL MALFUNCTION
Statistical analyses showing a positive relationship between how frequently a
jurisdiction imposes the death penalty for every one hundred homicides and the
likelihood that any resulting death verdict will be tainted by serious error,30 as
well as the developing literature on the causes of miscarriages and mistakes in
particular cases,3' suggest the following causal explanation:32 At great risk to both
reliability and efficiency, and apparently more so than in other parts of the
criminal justice system,33 capital trial and appellate procedures and incentives
reward the imposition of death verdicts based on factors other than the evidence
and the law. This tendency in turn disposes capital trials to outcomes the evidence
and law forbid and forces ill-equipped appellate judges to play the role of
surrogate sentencers in an effort to clean up the resulting mess. Put differently,
capital procedures and incentives handsomely reward trial actors on a per-death
sentence basis (for example, police, prosecutors, and trial judges), while shifting
the cost of mistakes made in the process to actors with too small or infrequent a
stake in the process to defend themselves and adequately protect their interests
(for example, state taxpayers, appellate courts, victims, and wrongly condemned
prisoners). And these actions in turn reward a different set of repeat actors-
defense-side capital appellate lawyers--on a per-reversal basis. Like a perpetual
29 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
30 See, e.g., John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals,
and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 465, 469 (1999) ("The [per-
murder] rate at which states impose [death] sentences strongly correlates with the rate at which
[post-sentence] relief was obtained from those sentences."); Overproduction, supra note 9, at
2068.
" Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2078-79 & n.137, 2102 & n.175 (collecting sources).
321 only briefly revisit this explanation here, having presented it in-depth in an earlier
article. Id. at 2073-136.33 See Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 135 (1998) (explaining that the pressure to identify, arrest, and convict
suspects for homicides is greater than for any other type of violent crime); Overproduction,
supra note 9, at 2053-54 n.90 (estimating a 5% to 10% reversal rate in noncapital cases), 2078-
82 (offering reasons why more error may be committed in capital than in other criminal cases).
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motion machine, these effects render stable over time a system defined by the
chronic instability and reversal of most of its outcomes.34
More specifically, the process appears to work as follows: Heinous killings
frighten communities and generate understandable and appropriate pressure to
find and decisively punish the responsible parties.35 In all capital-sentencing
jurisdictions, but particularly in ones where the political rewards of capital
punishment are high and direct (for example, where elections for district attorney
and trial judge are frequent and partisan and where voters favor the death penalty)
and in ones that believe themselves to be under siege from violent crime," such
offenses create incentives to move swiftly and surely from arrest to conviction to
capital verdict.37
Things get off-track at the very start of capital cases when these pressures
lead police and prosecutors to define a death sentence as the only just result-and
any other result as a defeat-even where a capital conviction or sentence is a
stretch given the evidence and the mitigating circumstances.38 Thus, marking a
case as capital trumps the usual institutional pressure to compromise and blocks
the plea bargaining that resolves most criminal cases.39 That in turn dampens the
usual exchange of information between the two sides. And it vastly expands the
defense lawyer's role-and skill level and resources that are required-from that
of a negotiator of routine deals good enough to dissuade defendants from taking
their chances at trial, to that of an investigator of a serious, often unwitnessed
crime; a mental health and forensic specialist; an expert on a complex and ever-
changing body of specialized statutory and constitutional law; and a trial litigator
whose craft includes the difficult and distinct arts of convincing a jury not to
believe beyond a reasonable doubt the state's claim that the defendant committed
a capital crime and, failing that, convincing it to believe the defendant's claim that
he had a good reason for doing what he now admits he did and says he will not do
again.40 Suddenly, the set of potential defense lawyers qualified to represent the
defendant dwindles to a handful, if it does not evaporate entirely. And the subset
See Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2155.
35 See id. at 2078-82.
36See Tina Rosenberg, Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1995 (Magazine), at 22
(attributing Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne Abraham's self-confessedly "passionate"
commitment to capital punishment, notwithstanding her doubts whether it deters crime, and her
use of it more often per homicide than any other prosecutor in the nation, to her conclusion that
it gives citizens "the feeling of control demanded by a city in decay" especially in light of her
observation that "[w]e feel our lives are not in our own hands.... This is Bosnia").37 Gross, supra note 33, at 127-28, 133-36, 149; Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2082-
100.
38 Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2087-98.39 Gross, supra note 33, at 144-45; Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2099-100.
40 See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital
Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 247-51 (1990-1991); Overproduction, supra
note 9, at 2108 & nn. 186-89 (citing other authorities).
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of those lawyers, if there are any, who are willing to take the case shrinks still
further, given the lucrative, competing opportunities from paying clients and
given the paltry compensation available for representing indigent capital
defendants-often the same hourly rate or even the same capped fee that the state
has designed to compensate negotiators of routine pleas in run-of-the-mill cases.4'
For all these reasons, capital defense all too often falls to the worst lawyers the bar
has to offer-frequently lawyers who can find no other work42-while placing
the highest demands on them.
The same pressures that lead district attorneys to make death sentences the
41 See, e.g., American Bar Ass'n & Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective
System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 16, 69 (1990)
(concluding, after a detailed study, that "inadequate compensation of counsel at trial" is one of
the "principal failings of the capital punishment systems in the states today"); Ruth E. Friedman
& Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama's Capital Defense Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense
Thing, 44 ALA. L. REv. 1, 21-39 (1992) (criticizing Alabama's built-in monetary
disincentive--maximum compensation of $20 per hour for any work done out of court and $40
per hour for in-court activity, with a $1000 reimbursement cap---against thorough
representation at the trial level); Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The
Unconscionability of Sub-Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43
RuTGERS L. REV. 281, 282 (1991) (examining the problem of "statutory limitations on the fees
paid to appointed counsel"); Albert L. Vreeland, II, Note, The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer.
Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 626, 628 (1991) (arguing that "fee limitations deprive indigent defendants of their right
to effective assistance of counsel"); see also Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error
in the Nation's Death Belt, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30 ("Wholly unrealistic statutory fee
limits on defense representation-such as Mississippi's flat, unwaiveable $1,000 cap [on
compensation for capital defense lawyers], equivalent to a fee of about $5 per hour for many
lawyers act as disincentives to thorough trial investigation and preparation."); Dirk Johnson,
Shoddy Defense by Lawyers Puts Innocents on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at A l
(providing evidence that capital defendants "are often represented by lawyers who are paid a
few thousand dollars, or less, and spend only two days on a case" and that a proper defense in a
death penalty case takes months of research and costs $250,000 or more); Sara Rimer,
Questions of Death Row Justice for Poor People in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at
A 16 (noting that Mississippi's flat, unwaiveable $1,000 cap on defense lawyer compensation
was in effect as late as March 2000); Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 21 (comparing capital
representation by appointed lawyers who handle close to 80% of Philadelphia capital cases for a
flat fee of $1,700 plus $400 for each day in court and $300 for an investigator, with an average
cost to the county in 1995 of $2,700 per capital case, to the rare representation by a retained
lawyer for whom the going rate in Philadelphia is $50,000 per case); Stan Swofford, A
Reasonable Doubt: Are There Innocent People on North Carolina's Death Row, GREENSBORO
NEWS & REC., Aug. 6, 2000, at Al (comparing North Carolina's $85 per hour cap on
compensation for defense attorneys appointed to represent indigent capital defendants to the
going rate of $200 or more per hour for such representation by experienced, retained criminal
defense lawyers in the state).
42Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2102-06, 2103-08 nn.176-85 (citing numerous
examples of low quality attorneys handling capital cases).
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sine qua non of justice also discourage elected trial judges43 from assiduously
enforcing legal and ethical boundaries that might keep the state from
overreaching in capital cases-assuming any transgression is even visible to the
judge.44 Nor is the slack likely to be taken up, except in extremely weak cases, by
jurors forced to decide between a noncapital verdict they typically, if erroneously,
believe would soon set loose a heinous killer on the community and a death
sentence they typically, if also erroneously, believe will be reversed on appeal if a
lesser sentence is more appropriate.45
But why is the jurors' latter belief erroneous? Why not rely on appellate
courts to catch invalid death sentences in the present, and why not rely on them,
via enough painful raps on reversed prosecutors' and trial judges' knuckles, to
keep capital verdicts within what the facts and law will bear in the future?
To begin with, the main function of appellate judges is to cure occasional
procedural errors, not to redress chronic substantive mistakes. This is partly
because there are too few appellate judges responsible for too many cases
containing too many errors. More fundamentally, although prejudice and
harmless error rules keep procedure from trumping substance when only
procedural errors occur,46 no comparable doctrines allow substance routinely to
trump procedure when even grave substantive errors occur without a procedural
miscue. Consequently, if jurors reach the wrong outcome, there is no assurance
that appellate judges have the power, even if they otherwise have the perspicacity,
to cure the mistake.47 Undoubtedly, therefore, some substantive error (along with
reams of "harmless" procedural error) goes undetected by the courts-as in the
cases noted earlier in which a full complement of courts cleared innocent
prisoners for execution.4
Still, as our study of error rates shows, appellate courts do frequently reverse
capital verdicts.49 A puzzle, therefore, is why preceding rounds of reversals do not
43 Elected judges preside at nearly all state capital trials. See A Broken System, supra note
1, at 133 n.54.
44 Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2111-14.
45 Id. at 2114-19.
46See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (discussing "materiality" and
"prejudice" standards for purposes of proving prosecutorial suppression of evidence and
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States Constitution); Brecht v.
Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 639 (1993) (establishing a heightened standard of harmfulness that
must be shown before habeas corpus relief may be granted based on constitutional error);
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967) (barring relief on direct appeal from most
errors if it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
47 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 390-91 (1993) (holding that there is no
constitutional bar to convicting, and even executing, an innocent prisoner, leaving no remedy
for innocent prisoners seeking federal habeas relief absent proof of a procedural violation in
their case).
41 Overproduction, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
49 A Broken System, supra note I and accompanying text.
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deter succeeding generations of error. The answer is that the feedback
mechanisms running from the appellate and post-conviction stages to the trial
phase are so anemic that, for the crucial trial-level actors, error is a nearly costless
by-product of the death sentences they find it politically profitable to
(over)produce.50 Those trial-level actors thus make more than the optimal level of
mistakes because they (1) benefit from those mistakes, yet (2) do not have to
internalize the costs of the mistakes. In the first regard, the political, professional,
and psychological benefit to local actors of each new death sentence is high."
Yet, in the second regard, the cost of each flawed death sentence remains very
low whether there is a 10% or a 70% likelihood that the sentence eventually will
be overturned because of its flaws. Prosecutors, trial judges, and juries thus have
incentives both to generate more death sentences and, in their search for new
prospects, to move from the core set of capital murders to, and well beyond, the
periphery of what the law defines as potentially capital offenses.
Erroneous death sentences clearly are not costless, however. Rather, their
substantial costs are borne by others.52 State and federal appellate courts must
undertake the substantive winnowing task that trial courts are supposed (and are
much better suited) to accomplish. Taxpayers throughout the state and nation, not
just those in the actual death-sentencing jurisdiction, must foot the bill. This in
turn renders local officials unaccountable to the vast majority of taxpayers who
pay for the officials' mistakes. Low-status line attorneys in the state attorney
general's office, to whom local prosecutors almost always hand off their flawed
handiwork, get the blame when, as so often happens, the flaws prompt reversal on
appeal. Victims bear even worse costs. Prosecutors almost never inform victims
of the error rates and delays characterizing most death sentences, so the agonizing
delays, reversals, and retrials are unexpected and excruciating.53 And this is not to
mention the egregious burdens imposed directly on wrongly condemned
defendants themselves. 4
Ironically, there is another conspirator in this process of absorbed benefits
and shifted costs: the death penalty defense bar, of which I have long been a
member. Too small and thinly financed to appear at the trial phase of every
potential capital case, this group of lawyers concentrates its resources at the small
number of strategic bottlenecks through which all actual capital sentences
thereafter must flow. At best, it focuses on state appellate and post-conviction
courts; wherever possible, on the entire federal habeas proceeding; and at the very
least, on federal circuit and United States Supreme Court review on habeas.
5
'o Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2119-29.
l Id. at 2078-82, 2078-80 nn. 137-39 (collecting sources that describe benefits of capital
sentences to repeat trial actors).52 Id. at 2129-36 (documenting these various costs).
3 See supra note 19.
54 See supra note 22.
55 Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2073-78, 2135-36.
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Having strategic positions on the heights leading into, or out of, the few narrow
canyons through which all death sentences must pass on their journey through the
appellate process, these lawyers are well-situated to intercept many-but
regrettably not all--of the unfit and unsuitable death sentences that prosecutors,
jurors, and judges have imposed. The success these lawyers attain at the later
stages of the review process, picking off many of the mistakes made at trial, leads
them to devote substantial resources to protecting their positions above the
strategic narrows and resisting proposals for changing the process.
The result is an uneasy but powerful alliance for preserving the basic
components of the existing system, from trial through the post-conviction review
process. And so arises the implacable stability of a system of frenetic instability-
i.e., of reversal, retrial, and eventual rejection of death sentences. 56
IV. BREAKING THE CYCLE
Describing the problem this way suggests the general outlines of a solution.
The goal is to make trial-level actors bear the costs of their mistakes in the course
of capital sentencing and to create incentives for them to avoid error and to limit
their attention to core capital cases. Similarly, the logical cure for an error-prone
system that chronically cycles products from a shoddy fabrication process to a
long, expensive inspection process and back again is to devote more resources to
the fabrication process in hopes that quality control eventually will require fewer
resources.
For some jurisdictions, these considerations might suggest a wholesale
solution, such as the abolition of, or at least a moratorium on, capital
punishment.57 Any government system is prone to misfeasance and malfeasance,
and for decades the death penalty system has succumbed to both. Why continue
to take the risk when lives are at stake and when effective risk controls are
expensive, uncertain, or unknown?
"'Id. at 2155.
57 In all, "major campaigns to suspend executions have been launched in nineteen [actually
twenty] states" in 2001, including moratorium and death-penalty study bills in Alabama (passed
the Senate Judiciary Committee), Arkansas, Connecticut (passed the Senate Judiciary
Committee), Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland (passed the entire
House and the Senate Judiciary Committee), Missouri, Mississippi, Nevada (passed the
Senate), New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas (passed
committees in both houses), Virginia, and Washington. Bill Blakemore, Support for Death
Penalty Drops (ABC World News Tonight, May 2, 2001). Abolition bills came close to passing
in the Winter 2001 legislative cycle in New Hampshire and New Mexico, and they were
proposed in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana (hearings
held in the House Judiciary Committee), Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, CHANGES IN
THE DEATH PENALTY AROUND THE U.S., at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Changes.html
(last modified Oct 26, 2001).
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Other jurisdictions, however, are not drawn to these solutions. The remainder
of this article addresses those counties and states, where the choices are real
reforms, cosmetic tinkering, or resignation.
A. Self-Sustaining Defense Systems
For this latter set of jurisdictions, one trial-level reform is obvious. In our
adversarial system, the most fundamental check and balance on prosecutorial
over-reaching and over-charging is a determined defense attorney. Prosecutors
who expect to lose at trial when they charge a marginal case capitally will be
more disposed to treat the case like most other criminal matters and plead it. If
they think cutting comers will be exposed, they are much less likely to cut
comers. And if other local officials and, ultimately, local taxpayers have to pay
defense lawyers to exercise those functions, the payors will exert additional
pressure to keep marginal cases out of court.
My focus here is on the system as well as the case. The result of reforms
should be a financially stable and expert capital defense bar in or accessible to
each local capital-sentencing jurisdiction.59 Whether that bar is privately or
publicly employed is less important than its attractiveness to skilled and energetic
attorneys who want to take capital cases that too often in the past have been
58 For a discussion of death penalty reform legislation considered during the Winter-Spring
2001 legislative cycle, see Tom Brune, Nation Examines Death Penalty: Amid Capital
Punishment Concerns, Federal, State Executions Declining, NEWSDAY, June 10, 2001, at AS;
Laurie Goodstein, Death Penalty Falls From Favor as Some Lose Confidence in its Fairness,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2001, at A14; John Harwood, Despite the McVeigh Case, Curbs on
Executions Are Gaining Support, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2001, at 1; Eric Lichtblau, Death
Penalty Reforms Gather New Momentum: With Dozens of Death Row Inmates Freed, a Cry
Rises for Precautions, Such as DNA Tests, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2001, at Al; Emilie
Lounsberry, Death Penalty's Fairness Debated Nationwide, PHILA. INQ., June 8, 2001, at Al;
see also Innocence Protection Act of 2001, H.R. Res. 912, 107th Cong. (proposing a reform
package that includes some of the reforms discussed in this article). The recent work of the
Committee to Prevent Wrongful Executions is also instructive. This Committee is "a
nonpartisan panel of judges, former prosecutors and victims advocates," some of them "strong
death penalty supporter[s]," that recently "spent a year studying capital punishment in the
United States" and made "18 proposals.., intended to make the death penalty more reliable
and less open to chance." Brooke A. Masters, Standards for U.S. Executions Proposed;
Nonpartisan Committee Seeks Broad Consensus on Reforming Death Penalty, WASH. POST,
June 27, 2001, at A4. Several of the Committee's proposals are similar to ones made in this
article, including recommendations to "[s]et mandatory-minimum standards for defense
lawyers and pay them adequately, and make it easier for death row inmates to get new trials if
they had bad lawyers"; "[f]ully inform juries by giving them the explicit option of life without
parole"; "[p]reserve and test DNA after convictions and make it easier for inmates to get new
trials based on newly discovered evidence"; and "urge[ ] prosecutors to open all their files to the
defense before trial." Id.
59 Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2147 & n.279.
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assigned to incompetent lawyers. 60
There are four components to any stable system of quality capital-defense
representation: (1) minimum lawyer qualifications; 61 (2) at least two lawyers per
case; (3) adequate compensation for lawyers and ample funds for experts and
investigators; 62 and (4) appointment mechanisms that prevent patronage and cost-
saving concerns from trumping quality.63 Useful points of reference in this regard
are provided by capital-defense systems in federal cases;64 the states of
60 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
61 William S. Sessions, Primary Goal Is Justice, Not Execution, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS
NEWS, July 19, 2000, at 5B (when the State seeks to take a defendant's life, "the standards of
competence for defense lawyers should be high, clear and enforced").
62 In a recent report, the American Bar Association described a variety of disturbing
techniques that insufficient funding has forced state appointing officials to use in order to secure
defense representation in capital cases, including patronage selections from a general list of all
local attorneys, regardless of capital, or even criminal, experience; contract systems under
which all cases over a particular period go to the lowest bidder (with a flat fee bid covering all
experts and other expenses), including complex and unanticipated capital cases that suddenly
appear on the county's docket; reimbursement schemes that limit lawyers to, for example,
$2,500 for the entire representation "plus $50 for each motion.., filed up tofive motions-with
the result that the number of motions filed in almost every case is exactly five-or $1,000,
including expenses for expert and investigative assistance"; or what amounted to "$15 to $20
per hour and $11.84 per hour" to represent two innocent men who were sentenced to die but
were eventually released for lack of evidence of guilt. Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report
Regarding Implementation of the American Bar Association's Recommendations and
Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POvERTY 1, 16, 18 (1996)
(emphasis added). Other sources have comprehensively documented the limited resources
available for capital defense. See, e.g., Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in
Capital Cases: the Indiana Experience and its Implications for the Nation, 29 IND. L. REV. 495,
496-500 (1996) (stating that "compensation for attomeys representing indigent capital
defendants is perversely low"); Joe Margulies, Resource Deprivation and the Right to Counsel,
80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 673, 678 (1989) (stating that "inadequate funding forces
appointed counsel to ration his or her time, which inevitably compromises his or her ability to
prepare the case"); Michael D. Moore, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: An Examination
and Analysis of State Indigent Defense Systems and Their Application to Death-Eligible
Defendants, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1617, 1632 (1996) (arguing that low compensation for
attorneys representing indigent capital defendants leads to problems of attorney "inexperience,
lack of training, and overburdening"); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded
Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 334 (1995)
(stating that the low levels of compensation given to attorneys representing indigent capital
defendants has had a "disastrous impact on the quality of defense services provided"); Coyle,
supra note 41, at 30.
63 Cf Paul M. Barrett, Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About System,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at Al; Mary Flood, What Price Justice? Gary Graham Case Fuels
Debate Over Appointed Attorneys, HOUSTON CHRON., July 1, 2000, at A l (stating that in some
Texas counties in the 1970s and 1980s, "courthouse appointment lists were often an informal
string of each judge's friends and campaign contributors; some were competent and trained,
others were not," and there were "no requirements for experience, no classes, no tests").
6Raymond Bonner, Charges of Bias Challenge U.S. Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
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Connecticut, 65 Colorado,66 Indiana,67 New Jersey,6 and New York;69 the city of
2000, at AI (explaining that in federal capital cases, federal law requires the appointment of two
lawyers for indigent defendants, at least one of whom must be experienced in capital litigation;
consequently, "claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not mark the federal system").
65 Richard P&ez-Pefia, The Death Penalty: When There's No Room for Error, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2000, at WK3 (contrasting high capital-sentencing states like Alabama and
Georgia, where there is "a culture of habitually appointing" lawyers in capital cases who "don't
know capital law, are cozy with the judges and are underpaid," with three states that finance
expert statewide capital defense units: (1) Colorado, which although "a Western state where the
death penalty is popular," has had only about three capital prosecutions a year, "in part, experts
say, because [prosecutors] believe that the Colorado Office of the Public Defender will defeat
all but the strongest cases"; (2) Connecticut, which also has a capital defense team of
experienced state public defenders and has had few capital prosecutions during the last twenty-
seven years; and (3) New York, whose "gold standard" Capital Defender Office employs
twenty-one highly trained trial lawyers and seventeen investigators and has an annual budget of
fifteen million dollars; has appeared in 524 cases in which a capital charge was a possibility,
and has liited the number of capital charges actually brought to thirty-nine with only five
death sentences actually imposed).
66 Rimer, supra note 41 (discussing capital defense systems in Colorado, New Jersey, and
New York); supra note 65.
67 Lefstein, supra note 62, at 496-504, 506-07, 509-12, 518-26, 533 (discussing the
apparent effect of Indiana's adoption in the early 1990s of legislation making state funds
available to local jurisdictions that satisfy a state commission's guidelines for appointment of
qualified counsel in capital cases; explaining the commission's incorporation within its
guidelines of a state supreme court rule (1) requiring the appointment of two lawyers in capital
cases with recent extensive training in capital defense and with, respectively, at least five and
three years criminal litigation experience that includes at least five and three felony jury trials;
(2) disqualifying lawyers with excessive workloads; (3) setting minimum hourly rates that are
relatively generous, though they remain well below the rates prevailing among retained
attorneys; and (4) assuring "adequate funds for investigative, expert, and other services
necessary to prepare and present an adequate defense at every stage of the proceeding,
including the sentencing phase"; noting that prosecutorial requests for death sentences dropped
from twenty-three per year in the two years before the reforms to ten per year in the three years
afterwards; reporting agreement among state capital prosecutors and defense counsel
interviewed before the data were available that the reforms (1) had improved the quality of
capital defense lawyering in the state, especially by increasing the use of expert witnesses at the
mitigation phase; (2) had attracted more and better defense lawyers to the work; (3) had
probably generated better police and prosecutorial preparation and decreased the likelihood that
the resulting (smaller number of) capital judgments would be reversed on appeal; and (4) in the
words of prosecutors, "ha[d] definitely put a damper on [their] asking for the death penalty,"
"put some economic judgment into the decision-making about whether to seek the death
penalty," and made them 'think two or three times' before filing a death penalty request," not
only because of the greater cost of trying cases but also because of the increased "risk [of]
losing"; comparing the Indiana experience to that of Ohio, which adopted similar reforms but
compensated defense lawyers at only two-thirds the rate in Indiana, provided funds for expert
witnesses and mitigation specialists far less frequently than in Indiana, and experienced smaller
declines in its death-sentencing rate than Indiana; and concluding that there is "strong[ ]" reason
to believe that the "ability of defense counsel, the cost of the prosecution, and the burden on the
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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in the minority of cases assigned to the public
defender;7 ° recent reforms in Illinois; 7' American Bar Association standards;
72
and some other recent reforms.73
Jurisdictions also need to establish registries of qualified capital defense
attorneys from which trial judges must select capital defense counsel. A national
registry assembled by the Administrative Office of the Court is a component of a
capital reform bill now pending in Congress.74 Alternatively, registries may be
created by individual states, 75 by private entities representing prosecutors and
prosecutor's staff," which in turn are affected by the quality and resources of defense counsel,
affect prosecutorial charging decisions in capital cases); cf Matthew S. Galbraith, State Law
Seeks to Provide a Strong Defense: Most Capital Cases Are Handled Well, but Examples of
Inadequate Representation Show Lapses in the System, STAR PRESS (Muncie, Ind.), Nov. 1,
2001, available at http://www.thestarpress.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2002) (confirming some of
Professor Lefstein's conclusions but identifying remaining "shortcomings" in the Indiana
capital defense system).
6' See Rimer, supra note 41; supra note 65.
69Daniel Wise, Prosecutors Show Caution Seeking Capital Sentences, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 13,
1999, at 1 (discussing well-funded and highly trained and qualified lawyers in New York's
Capital Defender Office); see also supra notes 41,65.
70 Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2102 n.175.
71Jo Thomas, New Death Penalty Rules Are Issued in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001,
at A 17 ("The Supreme Court of Illinois has adopted new rules governing the way death penalty
cases are handled. The rules ... set requirements for training and experience for all defense
lawyers and assistant prosecutors handling the cases.").
72 AMERICAN BAR AssoC., GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1989).
73 Flood, supra note 63 (discussing new requirements for capital defense lawyers in Harris
County, Texas, where "first-chair" capital attorneys may be certified only after trying serious
felony cases for at least five years, taking a three-day class sponsored by Harris County judges,
and passing a one hundred-question multiple choice test); Sandy Hodson, Death Row Gets Fit
Counsel, AUGUSTA CHRON., July 23, 2000, at BI (discussing the Georgia Supreme Court's
adoption, in early 2000, of new rules for defense attorneys appointed in death penalty cases,
which closely resemble ABA standards, requiring ten hours of training annually for defense
lawyers and directing judges to appoint defense lawyers who are "experienced and trained");
see also Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Revamp Urged in Handling of Capital Cases,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 1999, at I (reporting that several states "have established minimum
standards for defense attorneys in capital cases," which typically "require that at least two
attorneys be appointed in capital cases and that they have a certain number of years of
experience in trying criminal matters").
74 H.R. Res. 912, 107th Cong. (2001); S. Res. 486, 107th Cong. (2001); see, e.g., Mike
Doming, Death Penalty Reforms Gain Backers in D.C., CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 2000, at NI;
Leahy to Introduce Innocence Protection Act, U.S. NEwSwiRE, Feb. 4, 2000; Jim Yardley,
Death Penalty Politics: Bush Ensnared in Capital Punishment Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2000, at WK4; see also supra note 58.
7 Florida's recent supplementation of its state-funded Office of Capital Collateral
Representation with a registry of private defense lawyers is one example, although its relatively
weak standards, 840-hour cap on billable attorney hours, and mandatory agreements requiring
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defense lawyers (for example, some combination of the American Bar
Association, the National Association of Attorneys General, the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Association of District
Attorneys, and the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association), by a
consortium of private and public actors, or by regional organizations serving
several participating states. Some of the jurisdictions listed above have created
statewide or local capital defense registries of the sort contemplated here.76
Two other devices can help broaden the pool of well-qualified capital defense
lawyers and improve the balance of forces at trial. The first device is a stated goal
of demonstrable parity or near-parity between defense and prosecution resources.
Methods of achieving this parity or near-parity include: (1) mechanisms for joint
preparation of legislative budget requests by prosecutors, public defenders, and
criminal trial courts and for tying funding levels for capital defense to those for
prosecutors and judges;77 and (2) statutes assuring adequate public defense
lawyers to avoid making certain arguments on their clients' behalf have been a source of
deserved criticism. See, e.g., Jo Becker, System May Be Slowing Appeals, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, July 17, 2000, at I B (stating that the minimum qualifications for the private attorneys in
the Florida capital registry "fall below those recommended by a state Supreme Court
committee"); Flood, supra note 63 (discussing capital defense lawyer registry used in Houston,
Texas).
76 The salutary effects of requirements of these four types are most carefully documented
in Lefstein, supra note 62, which combines a statistical study with the results of interviews with
capital prosecutors and defense lawyers. The fact that an indigent client has secured private
counsel is not necessarily a reason to deny him all financial assistance. California and Florida
have recognized, for example, that providing support services (for example, necessary
investigators and experts) to defendants who exhaust their own resources in the process of
compensating retained counsel can save the state money by encouraging defendants to retain
their own attorneys while also helping to broaden the range of available lawyers, improve the
quality of capital representation, and approach defense-prosecution parity. See Rimer, supra
note 41.
77See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-293 (West Supp. 2001) (requiring public
defenders to receive salaries "comparable to those paid to state's attorney"); TENN. CODE ANN.
§16-2-518 (1994) (providing that every dollar increase in funding for the "district attorney
general" will be accompanied by a seventy-five cent increase in funding to the public
defender's office); Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1999, at 21
(proposing assurance of funding parity or near parity as one way to increase reliability of capital
verdicts); Steven Lee, Jim Liebman, Jonathan Sacks, & Anne Voighton, Galvanizing Gideon:
Diffuse Experiments and Democratic Experimentalism in Search of Improved Indigent Defense
Services 50-55, 58-63 (June 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Spangenberg
Group et. al, Tennessee Weighted-Caseload Study 8 (Apr. 1999) (final draft report, at
http://www.comptroller.state.tn.us/orea/reports/publdef.pdf) (devising an "empirical method of
measuring the amount of work required to be performed by public defenders on ... various
types of cases" in order to determine "public defender staffing needs" and to help devise
formulas for assuring parity in state funding for the prosecution and defense of the same cases).
See generally ANDY HARDIN, STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: A JOINT WORKLOAD STUDY FOR




The second device is peer evaluation of capital defense systems and lawyers.
Peer evaluation would serve a variety of goals. At a minimum, it would monitor
each individual lawyer's performance in each case, with successful evaluation
being a prerequisite for subsequent appointment. In addition, it could enable
capital-sentencing jurisdictions to cooperatively devise workable measures of the
adequacy of capital defense systems and to learn from each other's successes and
failures. Finally, it would enable defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges to
examine defense systems in neighboring districts without confidentiality or other
ethical problems.79
B. Reformed Roles for Prosecutors, Trial Judges, Jurors, and Appellate
Courts
Improved counsel is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Other needed
improvements include: (1) a longer waiting period before prosecutors decide
whether to proceed capitally in murder cases, during which a meaningful
exchange of information and plea bargaining with defense lawyers can take place;
(2) police and prosecutorial open files policies that cover, among other things, the
7See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.27 (West Supp. 2001) (ordering the state
commissioner of finance to pay for necessary expenses in indigent defendants' appellate and
post-conviction cases when the state public defender's office does not have sufficient funds);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 34.750 (Michie 2001) (requiring allocation of funds from the "statutory
contingency account" to the state public defender's office if the funds appropriated to the public
defender for the "necessary [defense] costs and expenses" of indigent defendants have been
exhausted); cf John North, Revamping the Indigent Defense System Ordered, KNOXVILLE
NEWS-SENTINEL, Aug. 22, 1994, at A4 (explaining the directives of the Tennessee Supreme
Court to "increase the hourly rate the state will pay private lawyers to represent poor clients"
and to create a commission with the power to "recommend a complete reconstruction of
Tennessee's indigent defense system").
'9The subjects of peer review might include: (1) the jurisdiction's standards for
determining lawyer qualifications and the number of lawyers per case; (2) its appointing
mechanism; (3) its compensation and support service levels; (4) the overall, or average,
adequacy and preparedness of either attorneys on the jurisdiction's roster of qualified capital-
defense lawyers or of the defense teams used in particular cases; and (5) the jurisdiction's
method of measuring defense/prosecution parity, or near parity, and its success in achieving that
goal. If a registry system is used, the authorities responsible for that system might be given the
responsibility of designing and canying out a peer evaluation process.
Peer evaluation teams might be composed of practicing defense attorneys, and even
prosecutors and trial judges from other jurisdictions. If the subject of peer review is, for
example, a local county, peer evaluators might appropriately come from other counties in the
state. If the subject of review is the state system, evaluators might come from other capital-
sentencing states. Assistance in identifying evaluators might be provided by state and national
associations of criminal defense attorneys, district attorneys, trial judges, and public financial
officers.
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past informing and testimonial records of jailhouse informants; (3) videotaped
confessions; (4) truth-in-sentencing instructions on the actual length of time
people convicted of murder must serve if they are not sentenced to death; (5)
enhanced, substantive direct review of death sentences designed to define and
limit capital verdicts to "core" capital cases; (6) more effective feedback to the
trial officials responsible for errors leading to reversal by, for example, personally
identifying the trial judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel whose mistakes
caused the reversal and requiring the trial prosecutor to appear on the brief and in
court as counsel of record in all tribunals in which capital verdicts are undergoing
review; and, crucially, (7) collecting information-comparable across
jurisdictions statewide--on each defense attorney's, prosecutor's, prosecuting
office's, trial judge's, and trial court's reversal rates on post-trial review of capital
cases, and disclosing that information to the public and media. In the last regard,
disclosure may occur on web sites; in court briefs and decisions addressing
claimed legal and ethical breaches of recidivist defense lawyers, prosecutors, and
judges; and to victims whose views are solicited on whether to charge cases
capitally. 80
C. A Trade
Commentators often begin and end with a set of proposals like these.8' For
two reasons, I decline to do so here. First, I doubt that many jurisdictions will
adopt a meaningful and adequately funded package of these reforms if the
package contains only proposals like those laid out above.82 Second, a
comprehensive solution to the problem of an irrational displacement of costs from
the trial to the review process requires a conscientious shifting of costs in the
other direction.83 The decisive question is whether a conscientious trade of trial
for post-trial procedures can induce a meaningful reform package.
The trade I propose is a real one, unlike the ineffectual options offered by
Chapter 154 of the Federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996'4 and the half-a-loaf Powell Commission proposal made in 1989. As
80 The reforms proposed in this paragraph are discussed in detail in Overproduction, supra
note 9, at 2144-54. See also supra note 58 (discussing the Innocence Protection Act and the
proposals of the National Committee to Prevent Wrongful Executions).
8' See, e.g., Overproduction, supra note 9; see also supra note 58 (summarizing reform
packages proposed by others).
' See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 26, at 422-23 (discussing the temptation to adopt
meaningless or window dressing reforms that either "do little to change the underlying practice
but may offer the appearance of greater regularity than they actually produce," or that make
people "more comfortable than they otherwise would be with the underlying practice" and,
consequently, reduce incentives for adopting further reforms).
83 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (describing the undesirable shift of costs
away from trial-level actors).
84 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C.
20021
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tempting as such partial or window dressing reforms may be-especially ones
that offer only minor new trial protections in return for drastic cuts in existing
appellate protections-such approaches are not comparable to the comprehensive,
self-evaluative, and self-correcting reforms I propose. In return for a genuine
assurance of the trial and direct appeal protections outlined above, capital
defendants would agree to give up state post-conviction review and a significant
amount of federal habeas review.
This feature of my proposal has three objectives. First, it aims to establish
trial and direct appellate protections that are improved and certain enough to
convince each capital defendant, knowingly and intelligently, to trade existing
post-conviction review rights for those protections. Second, the reform package is
designed to be sufficiently attractive to state officials to encourage them to adopt
it. To achieve this goal, the package must, among other things, compensate those
officials for the loss of strategic advantages they now achieve through the state
§§ 2261-66 (Supp. IV 1998), includes a set of "Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital
Cases" that substantially limit federal habeas review and relief in capital cases from "opting-in"
states that put modest additional resources into the least important part of the process, namely,
state post-conviction procedures. § 2261.
Notably, five years after the AEDPA's adoption, not a single state has been willing to
provide the resources needed to qualify for the significant habeas advantages the Act would
then make available. I JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3.3a (3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 2000); Alexander Rundlet, Comment,
Opting for Death: State Responses to the AEDPA 's Opt-In Provisions and the Need for a Right
to Post-Conviction Counsel, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 661, 708 (1999) (discussing "States' failure
to respond to the [AEDPA's] opt-in provisions"). This reluctance implies that providing more
meaningful state post-conviction review, as opposed to improved trial proceedings, is not a
cost-effective strategy. These provisions have generated other criticism. See, e.g., Fred
Cheesman et al., A Tale of Two Laws: The U.S. Congress Confronts Habeas Corpus Petitions
and Section 1983 Lawsuits, 22 LAW & POL'Y 89, 90, 95, 99, 105 (2000) (drawing conclusion
from a statistical study that the AEDPA has had "virtually no impact" on the number of habeas
petitions filed and has had an "almost complete lack of success" in moderating the burdens such
petitions place on state lawyers and the federal courts); Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2043,
2136-37; Claire Cooper, Death Penalty Rules Blasted, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 15, 2000, at A l
("[A] growing number of lawyers and judges say [the] AEDPA's measures designed to
improve efficiency are stalling appeals more than ever before."); Howard Mintz, The Capital
Punishment Gridlock: Federal Reform Fails to Speed Up Process, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Mar. 13, 2000, at 8A (concluding that, four years after its enactment, the AEDPA "has had little
effect in states notoriously slow in processing death penalty appeals").
85 JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE REPORT ON FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES (1989), reprinted in 45 CRIM. L. REP. 3239, 3242 (1989) (stating
that "few would argue that the current state of death penalty administration is satisfactory,"
especially in light of the fact that the current system is filled with unnecessary delays and under-
qualified counsel); see also Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on
Recent Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1665, 1668,
1674-85 (1990) (providing careful analysis of Powell Commission report and criticizing it as a
"band-aid solution" to "what ails the system").
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post-conviction proceedings the proposal will suspend. 6 Finally, the package
86 A plan to eliminate state post-conviction proceedings must reallocate responsibility for
resolving claims-mainly of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial
suppression of evidence--that require post-trial factual development and thus are not typically
capable of being adjudicated on state direct appeal. Under federal law, states may insist that
capital prisoners exhaust available state collateral remedies for these violations before asserting
them on federal habeas corpus, which gives state courts the ability to preclude federal
evidentiary proceedings and fact findings by providing their own (assuming theirs are,
respectively, reasonable and not manifestly erroneous). 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), 2254(d)(2),
2254(e) (Supp. IV. 1998). State court determinations of "mixed questions of law and fact" also
get some deference in later federal habeas proceedings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386
(2000) (interpreting § 2254(dX1)). As a result, eliminating state post-conviction review while
leaving no other available state remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel, suppression of
evidence, and the like might sometimes replace state court with federal court responsibility for
hearing evidence and deciding factual and "mixed" questions. Resistance to ceding this
advantage might deter states from adopting reforms of the sort proposed here. There are three
alternative ways to approach this issue.
First, states might expand direct appeal to include claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, suppression of evidence, and similar issues based on evidence outside the record.
Doing so would preserve the states' access to federal habeas rules requiring exhaustion of
available state remedies while affording presumptive finality to state court hearings and factual
and "mixed" determinations on these issues. This "unified appeal" solution has serious
disadvantages, however. It gives up many of the savings from eliminating state post-conviction
review because it retains important aspects of that review and simply fuses them onto direct
appeal. Moreover, because an appellate lawyer cannot ethically litigate his or her own
"effectiveness" at the trial of the same case, unified appeal procedures force states to appoint
new lawyers on appeal. (Absent unified appeal, most states use the same defense lawyers at trial
and on appeal.) As a result, the unified appeal process nearly doubles the number of lawyers
needed to staff capital cases, and it increases the time and cost of appeals as new appellate
lawyers familiarize themselves with the case. Because states have a constitutional duty to
provide and fund "effective" appellate, but not post-conviction, lawyers, unified appeals
increase counsel costs and the likelihood of post-appeal claims of the denial, or ineffective
assistance, of appellate lawyers. Unified appeals thus force something like the enhanced
collateral review that the 1996 Antiterrorism Act invited states to adopt in return for tactical
advantages in habeas proceedings but that all states have thus far declined to adopt. See supra
note 84.
California's experiment with unified appeal procedures is instructive. Although California
has eliminated state post-conviction review and combined it with direct appeal, its appeals
process now takes longer than in virtually any other state. The main bottleneck is an average
delay offour years after trial ends and before the appeal begins. During this period, state judges
search for appellate lawyers willing and able to take the case, and the new lawyers review the
trial record and begin preparing briefs. In non-unified appeal states, by contrast, the transition
period from trial to appeal typically lasts a few weeks-the time it takes court reporters to
prepare the record of trial. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Behind the Death Row Bottleneck, N. Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1998, at WK1 (noting that because of a shortage of money for appellate
attorneys, California capital defendants wait an average of four years to be assigned a new
appellate lawyer and thus to begin their appellate proceedings); Paul Elias & Rinat Fried, A
Failure to Execute, THE RECORDER, Dec. 15, 1999, at 12 (concluding that the counsel
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attempts to solve the monumental "transition" problem presented by the 3,700
people currently on death row.8 7 Because these people will not benefit from trial-
level reforms, they have no reason to agree to reduced post-conviction review.
They consequently will continue to require both existing levels of post-conviction
spending and attention from the anti-death penalty bar for many years to come.
This in turn will discourage the adoption of reforms that are likely to be attractive
and effective only if they cut review costs and attract the anti-death penalty bar
away from post-conviction review. The main mechanisms for achieving all three
of these goals are three case-level markets for death penalty reforms-two
focused on new capital cases and the other focused on preexisting ones.
bottleneck at the beginning of California capital direct appeals is partly responsible for the fact
that "[s]ince 1978, when ... California ... reinstat[ed] the death penalty, 647 men and women
have been sentenced to death" but "[o]nly eight have been executed" and "[n]early four times
as many... have died in San Quentin of causes other than execution"); Howard Mintz, Slow
Death: The Capital Punishment Gridlock, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, March 13, 2000, at Al
(citing similar statistics). As of 1995, 21% of the men and women on death row across the
nation were awaiting direct appeal; in California, the comparable number was 47%. A Broken
System, supra note 1, at 84, A- 15, A-63.
A second approach allows one round each of state appellate and federal post-conviction
review. This approach, which was used for a time in Arkansas, is now used by all states when
they opt to "waive" the exhaustion rule in particular cases. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)(2), (3) (Supp.
II 1996) (permitting state lawyers to waive the exhaustion requirement); Granberry v. Greer,
481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987) (also allowing state lawyers to waive the exhaustion requirement); 2
JAMES S. LiEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 23.2a (3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 2000) (citing numerous cases in which states waived exhaustion).
This strategy allocates all post-conviction claims-i.e., claims based on evidence outside the
trial record, such as ineffective assistance of counsel-to federal habeas review. Because the
switch to this system is preceded by substantial improvements in the qualifications (training and
experience) and funding (compensation and support services) for defense counsel in capital
cases, the likelihood of successful ineffective assistance claims declines substantially. The
decrease in habeas relief helps compensate states for giving up the tactical advantage of
presumptively decisive state court hearings and decisions of factual and "mixed" questions.
Given evidence that federal judges are no more prone to grant relief than state courts, see A
Broken System, supra note 1, at 39, and given recent legislation, such as the AEDPA,
narrowing the time for and breadth of federal habeas review, the tactical advantage from state
rather than federal evidentiary proceedings may be small in any event and worth ceding in order
to achieve the significant cost and time savings from a system of one state appeal and one
federal post-conviction review.
A third option is the one proposed here: to limit the number of "post-conviction claims"
(based on facts outside the trial record) that appellants can raise in any state or federal post-trial
proceeding. Because eliminating cognizable claims directly benefits states, without requiring
the creation of cumbersome alternative post-trial inspection regimes, it is more likely to be
attractive to states and effective in rationalizing the process.87 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., supra note 17, at I.
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1. Inducing Meaningful, Politically Palatable, Trial-Level Reforms
If convicted, capital defendants have a right under existing law to raise every
adequately preserved federal constitutional claim of trial error in both a state post-
conviction and federal habeas petition.88 These rights are certainly valuable. But
they are less valuable than an immediately enforceable assurance of a fair trial in
the first place.89 If a fair-trial assurance is strong enough, therefore, properly
advised criminal defendants should be willing to opt into a package of improved
enforceable trial and direct appeal rights in return for opting out of the right to
state post-conviction and federal habeas review that the package of new trial
rights is designed to supplant.9° For example, capital defendants assured of,
among other things, the appointment of first- and second-chair attorneys from a
registry of well-qualified lawyers who are adequately compensated and have
received favorable periodic peer reviews, should be willing to waive state post-
conviction review entirely and federal habeas review of right to counsel and
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The waiver would be contingent on two
things: (1) the fully advised defendant's conclusion at the beginning of the
process that what he gets is worth more than what he gives up; and (2) if the
defendant is convicted, a post-trial judicial determination on federal habeas
88 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403 (1993) (habeas review is available for
"any constitutional violation which had occurred at the first trial").
'9 Consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim is a frequent basis for
post-conviction relief in capital cases, but it is made far more often than it succeeds. This is
because the legal standard for ineffective assistance includes a strong presumption of attorney
competence and places a heavy burden on the defendant-a burden the Supreme Court has
found satisfied only once. Compare Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (finding that
ineffective assistance of counsel was proven), with Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993),
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (all
rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claims). To prevail on an "ineffective assistance"
claim, a habeas petitioner (1) must "identify acts or omissions of counsel that are.., not ... the
result of reasonable professional judgment [and that], in light of all the circumstances,. . .were
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance," and (2) must demonstrate a
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690, 694. The vast majority of
ineffective assistance claims are denied because (1) the defendant fails to prove, after the fact,
that poor lawyering affected the trial outcome, or (2) the lawyer's challenged conduct is held to
be the result of a tactical or strategic judgment, which immunizes it from a finding of
unreasonableness. Given the vagaries of proving ineffective assistance on habeas, defendants
should be willing to waive the chance to try in return for a strong assurance of well-qualified
representation in the first place.
90 Counsel appointed under either the pre-existing system or the new system would have a
conflict of interest in advising the defendant, respectively, either to stick with the old trial
system and not waive post-conviction rights or to opt into the new system and waive those
rights. As a result, the state, or the bar on a voluntary basis, would have to supply attorneys to
serve the single, preliminary role of advising defendants of what their rights would be under the
pre-existing system and the new system so the defendant could make an informed decision.
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corpus that he indeed got what he bargained for-two attorneys with the specified
qualifications, compensated at the specified levels, and so forth.9'
The proposed reform package thus would include its own litmus test of the
reforms' value to capital defendants. In order to become operational, the reforms
would have to provide an assurance of procedural fairness strong enough to
induce criminal defendants to choose the reforms over some of their existing
rights to post-conviction review. To emphasize the importance of causing
substantial proportions of capital defendants to "vote with their feet" by opting
into the new regime and out of the old one, the legislature should discontinue the
entire reform package unless a majority of all capital defendants choose the new
regime during a specified period of time.
But if the reforms are so valuable to capital defendants, why would states
adopt them? First, abolishing state post-conviction review and limiting federal
habeas corpus would greatly benefit states. State post-conviction review would be
eliminated entirely in capital cases, instead of requiring the prolonged litigation it
"' The following parallel lists illustrate the kinds of trade-offs that would be included in the
reform package:
Three Exemplary Fair-Trial Components of a Meaningful Reform Package:
1. Appointment of one "well-compensated" and "well-supported" first-chair attorney and one
"well-compensated" and "well-supported" second-chair attorney from a list of "well-qualified"
capital defense attorneys who have had successful periodic peer reviews through the time of
trial and for some reasonable period of time thereafter. "Well-qualified," "well-compensated,"
and "well-supported" are defined by statue in clear, objective terms.
2. Defendant's ability, no later than a specified date before trial, to inspect all unprivileged
documents and evidence on the relevant crime in police and prosecutor files.
3. Use at trial of legislatively specified, fair, and comprehensible instructions on: each element
of capital murder; the state's burden of proof in regard to elements of the offense; the definition
of each statutory aggravating factor alleged to be present in the case; the jury's obligation to
determine whether, notwithstanding the presence of one or more aggravating factors, the
mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors; each juror's obligation to assess the
existence and weight of aggravating factors; and the parole consequences of a sentence other
than death.
Three Parallel Claims that Defendants Might Be Asked to Waive When They Opt into the
Reforms:
1. Denial of pretrial and trial counsel; ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
2. Prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory and impeachment evidence and other discovery-
related violations.
3. Constitutionally invalid instruction on: each element of capital murder; the state's burden of
proof in regard to elements of the offense; the definition of each statutory aggravating factor
alleged to be present in the case; the jury's obligation to determine whether, notwithstanding the
presence of one or more aggravating factors, the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating
ones; each juror's obligation to assess the existence and weight of aggravating factors; and the
parole consequences of a sentence other than death.
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now consumes in every case. Moreover, one or more of the claims designated for
waiver under the proposed system is raised in nearly every capital prisoner's
federal habeas petition. Between 1973 and 1995, those claims-denial of counsel,
ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory
evidence, and constitutionally invalid jury instructions-accounted for about 75%
of the grants of state post-conviction and federal habeas relief.92 Moreover,
federal habeas corpus would not be truncated by the usual method of adding
procedural roadblocks-which often also adds litigation time93 -but instead by
eliminating altogether the most frequently litigated habeas claims.94
Nevertheless, the trial-level actors who now freely receive the concentrated
benefits of the existing system 95 might oppose any such package of reforms. And
their views are likely to carry great weight with state legislators. The solution is to
extend the market for reforms to prosecutors, allowing them also to decline the
reformed system. Concerns that no jurisdiction will opt into the reform package
ignore a crucial discovery of both our study and others: Different jurisdictions
within each capital-sentencing state have very different attitudes about the death
penalty. Some counties use the death penalty sparingly; others use it lavishly.
96
Presumably, the former would gladly accept state money to help them do what
they try to do anyway: use trials to reliably distinguish the few "core capital
offenses" from the many peripheral and clearly noncapital cases. And, once
opting-in counties begin reaping the benefits of state subsidies, faster post-trial
review, and lower reversal rates for their dwindling number of death sentences,
officials in jurisdictions that do not opt in might come under pressure to explain
their decision to decline those benefits.
Moreover, legislatures should consider adopting a modest stick to
complement the carrot of state funding.97 For example, states could require
92 Capital Attrition, supra note 1, at 1850.93 CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, TOWARD A MORE JUST AND
EFFECIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES: A REPORT CONTAINING THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING DEATH PENALTY HABEAS
CORPUS AND RELATED MATERIALS FROM THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION'S PROJECT ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS 94-95 (Ira Robbins ed., 1990)
(noting the "lengthy and time-consuming litigation of threshold questions," "Sisyphean...
procedural" maneuvers, and "satellite proceedings" that procedural limitations on federal
habeas review have generated in an effort to "prevent the federal courts from reviewing [the
merits of] constitutional claims," thereby "delay[ing] the process of... review").
94 Waivers would be effective only if the specified trial component was actually afforded,
but, as in the examples given in the text, that question in most instances could be answered
instantaneously from the trial record or a police officer's or prosecutor's certificate.
95 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
96See, e.g., Overproduction, supra note 9, at 2068-70 n.l 14; Richard Willing & Gary
Fields, Geography of the Death Penalty, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 1999, at 1A (finding that
"[f]ifteen counties account for nearly a third of all prisoners sentenced to death [in the United
StateJ but only one-ninth of the population of the states with capital punishment").
Or, after a predetermined waiting period, all jurisdictions with capital case reversal rates
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jurisdictions that do not opt for the reforms to pay a percentage of the court costs
in any case in which a post-reform capital verdict from their jurisdiction is
reversed.98 Even if the monetary penalty is nominal, it would amplify the warning
signal sent to counties that both fail to opt into the new reforms and continue to
have high error rates.
2. Taming Transition Costs
Thus far, I have evaluated the viability of a system of elective reforms only
from the perspective of the system's effect on new cases. But what of the 3,700
old cases that will continue to impose the costs of the old-style, full-blown system
of post-trial review on states, even while the state is trying to divert resources to
the reformed trial process? It is the grueling, often mutually enraging demands of
these preexisting cases that usually drive the reaction to reform proposals by both
prosecutors and the anti-death penalty bar. Prosecutors fear that meaningful trial-
level reforms will cast a cloud over the existing, pre-reform death verdicts.
Defense attorneys oppose appellate-level reforms, even nonretroactive ones
traded for real trial-level reforms. They worry that the impression that all trial-
level problems have been solved will cause reviewing courts and the public to
stop scrutinizing pre-reform death sentences.
An elective scheme might solve this problem by creating incentives for
states' attorneys to offer or secure pleas in pre-reform cases to life imprisonment
without parole, or some lesser sentence, in return for an agreement on the
prisoners' part to waive all further appeals. 99 Many permutations are possible. For
example, consider a law that gives prisoners serving pre-reform death sentences a
brief opportunity in which to apply for a recommendation from an existing or ad
hoc state board that they receive a lesser sentence, such as life without parole, in
above the statewide average in the two previous years might be required to pay a percentage of
the court costs in cases in which reversals occur. Opting for the reforms should enable
jurisdictions to restart the clock.
98 At a minimum, jurisdictions that do not opt in should have to pay such costs if, after an
initial period, capital verdicts coming from their jurisdiction are reversed more often than the
statewide average. The money might go into a fund to defray the costs of the new reforms.
99 Another presenter at this Symposium has recently made a similar proposal:
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer of the Ohio Supreme Court recently suggested taking a closer
look at the state's death penalty. A sponsor of Ohio's 1981 capital punishment law, Pfeifer,
a Republican, has reconsidered his position and now votes against executions.
In April ... Pfeifer called for Gov. Bob Taft to form a panel to evaluate all 201 Death
Row cases to see how many could be commuted to life in prison without parole.
"We know we're not going to execute all these people on Death Row," Pfeifer said.
Alan Johnson, Ohio Study of Execution Law Sought, CoLuMBus (Ohio) DISPATCH, June 18,
2001, at Al.
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return for waiving all future appeals.' °° Applications might be based on: the
likelihood of success in post-trial review and retrial proceedings, doubts about
guilt of the capital crime, the relative aggravating and mitigating factors, or reason
to believe that a lesser sentence would be imposed if the case were tried under the
newly reformed regime.' 0' The board would then identify some predetermined
and fairly large percentage of the applicants for whom a plea arrangement is most
appropriate, given the relatively high likelihood of reversal or the relatively weak
case for death.'0 2 At that point, local prosecutors could, for any or no reason,
reject a plea in any case on the board's list. If prosecutors rejected a plea,
however, their districts would have to pay half of the state's litigation and
adjudication costs if the relevant death sentences were later overturned.0 3
The hope is that the market in settlements would be largely self-regulating.
Prisoners would have an incentive to apply only if they thought there was a
chance the board might endorse a plea in their case. Prosecutors would have an
incentive to follow the board's recommendation in cases in which they agree with
it or at least think there is a reasonable chance of either reversal or clemency.
Courts and clemency officials might pay some attention to the board's
recommendation, though uncertainties in the process and standards would
moderate that effect. Overall, reopening cases to this extent would give
prosecutors a chance to apply the heightened post-reform standards in re-
evaluating pre-reform cases without entirely forcing their hands.
'oo Filed with the application would be proof that the prisoner has been properly advised
and has agreed to accept the proposed plea in return for waiver of all future appeals.
'0' Prosecutors, victims, or others could respond, although the board would not be
permitted to give any weight to a prosecutor's statement that he or she would not accept any
plea that might be offered in a particular case.
102 If the board recommends a plea to a higher sentence than the prisoner agreed to, the
prisoner need not accept the plea. The board's recommendation or refusal to make one could be
brought to the attention of a reviewing court (and later to clemency officials) but would be due
no deference in court and would not have to be explained in any administrative "decision."
'03 The prosecutor's acceptance of the board's proposal would immunize the district from
any costs upon reversal. Money received from non-opting-in counties following reversal would
go into a fund to defray the costs of the new reforms. Plea agreements directly between
prosecutors and death row inmates, without the intervention of the administrative board, would
also be authorized and might be used in lieu of pleas on the board's list.
Alternatively, local prosecutors could be authorized to reach plea agreements with death
row prisoners in which the prisoners accept a sentence of life without parole in return for
waiving all further appeals. The state's attorneys could decline to enter into any such
agreements, but districts with three or more death row inmates that fail to offer qualifying pleas
to at least one-half of those inmates would be required to pay some substantial proportion of the
state's litigation costs if any pre-reform death sentence is overturned. Districts with two pre-
reform death row inmates that fail to offer a plea to at least one such prisoner would also be




Arguably, high rates of serious error in capital cases reveal problems whose
scope and extent are too ambiguous to support any changes. On the other hand,
the problems they reveal might be so serious, and have causes so inscrutable or
incurable, that only a temporary or permanent ban on executions will suffice.
Both arguments have been made recently.' °4 But the outpouring of concern about
the death penalty leading up to, and the myriad reform proposals made during, the
2001 state and federal legislative cycle °5 reveal substantial dissatisfaction with
the status quo. And the rough sledding those reform proposals have encountered
in some states suggests the need there for more finely tuned proposals. In that
spirit, and for the consideration of the more adventuresome, reform-minded
states, I offer these more comprehensive and nuanced proposals.
'04 Compare Steiker & Steiker, supra note 26, at 421, with Ensuring Competent Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases: Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Protecting the
Innocent, 107th Cong., June 27, 2001, available at LEXIS, Legislation & Politics, U.S.
Congress, Committee Hearing Transcripts (testimony of South Carolina deputy prosecutor
Kevin Brackett) (explaining that the proposed Innocence Protection Act of 2001, H.R.
Res. 912, 107th Cong. (discussed supra note 58):
... is premised on the supposition that incompetence and underfunding [of defense
counsel] are rampant through the system. I know that this is the position taken by those
who are opposed to capital punishment under any circumstances. I do not believe that an
objective study of capital punishment in this country would support this premise, however.
It would be much more practical to undertake a thorough, objective assessment of the
system first, and then proceed to recommend positive changes).
05 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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